Alpha Cyber

Graphing FuRootkit Infrastructure Rapid Infra Mapping & IOC Blocklist

FuRootkit is not a single binary, it’s an infrastructure. Our Graphing FuRootkit Infrastructure service builds an actionable map of how this rootkit’s campaign is assembled (drop points → loaders → kernel hooks → C2/beacons → persistence), so defenders can see choke points, prioritize takedowns, and automate containment without calling out any mapping product names.

Alpha Cyber Research3 min readupdated 1 Apr 2026
Fu-rootkit-hide-process

FuRootkit is not a single binary  it’s an infrastructure. Our Graphing FuRootkit Infrastructure service builds an actionable map of how this rootkit’s campaign is assembled (drop points → loaders → kernel hooks → C2/beacons → persistence), so defenders can see choke points, prioritize takedowns, and automate containment  without calling out any mapping product names.

Why map a rootkit infrastructure?

FuRootkit Graph

Rootkits live in layers: userspace droppers and installers, kernel modules or drivers, and distributed C2 and staging hosts. Mapping uncovers:

Persistent infrastructure nodes that matter most (C2 clusters, artifact-hosting providers, paste/raw endpoints).
Attack paths from initial delivery to kernel-level persistence.
Re-usable artifacts (same certs, imports, filenames) that speed detection across environments.

Mapping turns a noisy IOC list into a prioritized remediation plan.

Key Static Findings (PEStudio highlights)

A quick static analysis of a representative FuRootkit sample (PEStudio-style review) showed several red flags that should be triaged immediately:

AV Detections: ~41 antivirus engines flag the sample as malicious a high consensus that indicates a widely recognized malicious binary.

PEStudio FuRootKit Total

Suspicious imports (28 marked malicious): PEStudio-style analysis highlights numerous dangerous kernel and low-level APIs often used by rootkits, including ZwWriteFile, IoCreateDevice, and suspicious randomness/obfuscation calls like rand, indicative of direct disk/driver manipulation and stealth techniques.

PEStudio FuRootkit Imports

Certificate issues: the sample contains an expired code-signing certificate, reducing any claim of legitimacy and strengthening the case for blocking and takedown.

PEStudio FuRootkit ExpiredCert

These static signals (high AV consensus, kernel APIs, expired cert) strongly increase confidence the sample is malicious and justify urgent containment and hunting.

Compact IOC table format

Below is a concise, narrow-format IOC table designed for quick ingestion into firewalls, proxies, EDR, and SIEM. Use the hxxp and bracketed-dot notation when sharing outside of automated ingestion to avoid accidental clicks; convert to real URLs/IPs only in safe, controlled tooling and sandboxes.

CategoryFuRootkit SHA‑256 Sample
Sample 1f62ce3383afe1b36d60c834b9e6bd09263fb8794c626bc42fcbb25a062e76c42
Sample 2ed516fc2448dad8c157d2ff3d23088bf25fd92ecd809a1f01ec41c927c2cb5ec
Sample 36e6acc00afdb254d855c1adc5f27386ccfd398f4d893c44238c6ac596f8a3132
Sample 49114dc1c44f6a1b7d63ca95e04541d833c49a3e65a717471042bd0ec19a3eb99
Sample 56a0390769feeb703962e81f70896a1dfd1ea14479b9e200bcc530b238990c759
Sample 6478919d31d12026fe9ee51d1332701cd5e350b33d2bcf9365b462a1a25d56680
Sample 7142c6f5b7079f87e65df022f5fccfe229a0f41803c0d3eee42d38ed09eb73b86
Sample 810cf63dce9ea260f48def203313edcec06a293db3e35589954a99582c0a7e1d2
Sample 90f5e3d33c824f9f03d038b4f1a376b15cc5f1694aef086bd17c516ad951fc45a
Sample 1003e903602037420acf4d1bc5084923c59385c5594f3a2de6fcf320bd4746d6c7

The hashes in the table above are illustrative, not indicators harvested from a live campaign. Take the exact hashes from your own sample before ingesting anything into a blocklist.

Tactical steps we recommend

1. Immediate containment: block the listed IPs/domains at perimeter and proxy; blacklist filenames and service names at EDR.
2. Hunt for kernel artifacts: query for unsigned or expired-signed drivers, services created recently, and processes using ZwWriteFile/IoCreateDevice.
3. Isolate and image endpoints that show signs of persistence for full forensic triage, rootkits can survive reboots and hide in driver/service layers.
4. Replace/rollback compromised certs: if your supply chain uses code signing, ensure revoked/expired certs aren’t accepted by your internal validation.
5. Upstream abuse & takedown: file abuse reports for hosting providers serving listed C2 endpoints; provide time-stamped evidence and samples.
6. User/installer controls: block execution from common staging folders, restrict driver/service installation to approved code-signers, and enforce least privilege for service installation.

What our Graphing FuRootkit Infrastructure service delivers

A visual, prioritized infrastructure graph showing delivery vectors, staging hosts, beacon clusters, and persistence nodes.
Actionable blocklists (IPs, URLs, hashes, registry keys, filenames) exportable to your firewall/proxy/EDR in CSV/STIX/JSON.
Hunt playbooks and SIEM/EDR queries targeting the dangerous imports and behaviors (e.g., kernel API use, driver loads).
Takedown kit (provider contacts, timestamps, forensic evidence) for high-value C2 nodes.

Final note

High AV consensus (≈41 engines), kernel-level imports (ZwWriteFile, IoCreateDevice, etc.), and an expired certificate together form a strong case that a sample is malicious and engineered for stealth and persistence. Mapping the full infrastructure, not just the file, lets you stop the campaign strategically, not just react to single artifacts.

Keep reading

Related research

Daxin Rootkit
Threat ReportsTLP:AMBER

Daxin Returns: A 13-Year-Old China-Linked Rootkit That Never Called Home

Symantec found the Daxin kernel rootkit still operational on a Taiwan manufacturing subsidiary in 2026, alongside a previously undocumented backdoor, Stupig, that runs SYSTEM commands from the Windows logon screen before anyone signs in.

6 min readAPT

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